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Open versus Closed Conference Calls:
The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure

ABSTRACT

Recent advances in information technology allow ftrms to provide broader access to their
disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited realtime access to conference calls (i.e., "open" conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the
decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a ftrm's investor base and, to
some degree, the complexity of its ftnancial information. We also find that open calls are
associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on
information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period.

JEL classification:

M41, M44, Gl2, Gl4, G39, K22

Key Words: Confe rence calls, Corporate disclosure, Selective disclosure, Price volatility,
Institutional investors

1.

Introduction
Recent adv ances in information technology have led to dramatic changes in the ability of

managers to disseminate information to the capital markets. Firms can now use company
websites and/or ''webcast" conference calls via the Internet to communicate information
immediately, broadly, and inexpensively to all investors. These methods provide investors
formerly excluded from live information releases with unlimited access to timely information,
which they can then use to execute trades in real-time (Reilly, 2000). These advances have made
the decision of how broadly to disseminate voluntary disclosures a key choice in a firm's
disclosure policy, with implications for how the market will react to the firm ' s disclosures.
While prior research has examined the decision to provide voluntary disclosures (Healy and
Palepu, 200 1; V errecchia, 200 1), there is limited ev idence regarding the choice and market
impact of broadly disseminating disclosures.
We investigate the determinants and effects of the decision to broadly disclose
information by focusing on the choice to provide "open" conference calls (i.e. calls that allow
unlimited access) to discuss quarterly earnings releases. Despite the low cost and widespread
availability of the technology to provide open calls, only 55% of our sample utilizes it. We
obtain a sample of fmns that provide unlimited access to their conference calls from
BestCalls.com. We then identify firms who provide "closed" calls (i.e. calls that restrict access
to invited professionals) using conference call data obtained from First Call.
We hypothesize that the decision to host an open conference call depends on managers '
incentives to prov ide all investors and stakeholders immediate access to information. In our
determinants test, we examine whether managerial incentives to provide open calls are related to
the composition and demands of the firm's investor base, the complexity of the information

1

discussed in a conference call, and the demands of employees for unfiltered information about
the company. We find that firms providing open calls have a greater number of shareholders
(relative to other firms their size), lower institutional ownership, lower analyst following, and
higher average share turnover than closed call firms. These results are consistent with firms
opening conference calls to meet nonprofessional shareholders' demands for information. Firms
with higher intangible assets are also less likely to provide open calls, consistent with the idea
that firms with more complex financial disclosures target the information to more sophisticated
users (i.e., financial analysts and institutional investors). These results could reflect endogenous
relations between the decision to host open calls and the firm characteristics. However, using
lagged values of the firm characteristics produces similar findings, suggesting that the decision to
host an open call is a function of firm characteristics in place prior to the decision. In addition,
contemporaneous changes in the firm characteristics are generally not statistically different
between open and closed call firms, indicating that the results are not driven by changes in firm
characteristics subsequent to the decision to host open calls.
N ext, we investigate the impact of open conference calls on trading patterns during the
call period. These tests provide evidence on whether broader real-time access to information
results in greater trading by individual investors, higher price volatility, and/or higher trading
volume during open call periods than during closed call periods. Prior research finds that
average trade size increases during conference calls, suggesting that larger investors trade during
these calls (Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner, 1999). We find that open calls are associated with an
increase in small trades (trades ofless than $10,000), suggesting that individual investors exploit
their opportunity to trade on information released during open call periods. We also f"md that
open calls are associated with higher price volatility relative to closed calls, but find no effect on
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trading volume. These results indicate that providing individual investors access to conference
calls increases the amount of informedness and consensus in the market. Alternatively, it is
possible this higher price volatility is due to individual inv estors ' overreacting to information
released during the call, a common fear of managers who desire to keep their calls closed (IRB
Staff, 2000; NIRI, 2000b ).
This paper contributes to our understanding of managers' disclosure choices in a number
of ways. While prior research has generally focused on the initial decision of whether to make
information available to the capital markets (e.g., Tasker, 1998; Frankel, Johnson and Skinner,
1999), we examine the factors that influence how broadly managers choose to deliver the
message. We also provide evidence on the consequences of making information more widely
av ailable to the investing public. For example, based on concerns over selective disclosure of
information, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently passed Regulation Fair
Disclosure (Reg FD), requiring all firms to provide open access to any "material" new
information.1 The controversy surrounding the passage of Reg FD suggests significant
uncertainty regarding the consequences of making information widely available. The evidence
in this paper helps to resolv e this uncertainty.
In the next section we discuss the distinction between open and closed conference calls

and describe our dataset In Section Three, we discuss possible determinants of open conference
calls. We also describe the methodology used to test our hypotheses and discuss the results of
this analysis. Section Four provides a discussion of the potential impact of open conference calls

1

Regulation FD went into effect on October 23, 2000, after the sample period of our study. The regulation requires
that (1 ) when an issuer intentionally discloses material information, it do so through public disclosure, not through
selective disclosure; and (2) whenever an issuer learns that it has made a non-intentional material selective
disclosure, the issuer make prompt public disclosure of that information.
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on trading patterns during the call along with the methodology and results of this analysis.
Concluding remarks are provided in the final section.

2.

Open versus closed conference calls
The increased use of conference calls over the past decade has prompted studies

examining the factors influencing a firm's decision to host a conference call (Tasker, 1998), the
impact of conference calls on trading (Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner, 1999), and the effect of
conference calls on analysts' forecasts (Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto, 2002). During the
sample period ofthese studies, a relatively small number of firms allowed individual investors
real-time access to their conference calls (Thompson, 2000). Further, even when a company
made their calls available to the public, it was costly to inform individual inv estors about the
dates, times, and call-in numbers. In the last three years, technological innovations have reduced
the costs of allowing individual investors to access conference calls.

2

A 2000 survey by the

National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) indicated 48% of the firms conducting conference
calls were webcasting the calls, allowing a virtually unlimited number of people access to the
call (Thompson, 2000).
We obtain data on open conference calls from BestCalls.com. This company does not
produce or broadcast conference calls but rather lists free information on open calls from a
variety of sources, such as: 1) the lists of broadcasting companies (e.g., V call and StreetFusion),
2) company researchers who contact companies to obtain conference call information, and 3)
companies themselves posting information to the website. The availability and timing of these
calls is generally well-publicized. BestCalls.com often posts the time of the call at least one

2

Companies that host webcast conference calls, such as Vcall, generally charge around $500 - $ 1,000 per call (NIRI
2001 ). Thus, the direct costs of providing calls are likely not material.
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week in adv ance of the call and trrms also frequently list their upcoming conference calls on
their websites. In addition, BestCalls.com, the broadcast companies, and many firms provide an
e-mail reminder function for registered individuals.
Our data from BestCalls.com includes open calls from March 1999 to June 2000. Table
1 provides descriptive statistics on this database. Panel A shows that the v ast majority of calls
relate to earnings announcements (89%), consistent with the sample in Frankel, Johnson, and
Skinner (1999). For our determinants test, we limit the analysis to live conference calls related
to an earnings announcement. We exclude other calls because they are more likely to pertain to
an unusual event (e.g. mergers, restructurings). For our tests of trading patterns during calls, we
further limit the sample to calls held during trading hours to ensure our results are not driven by
differences between regular and after-hours trading. Panel B indicates that webcasts are the
more popular form of open conference call, with 85% of calls being webcast versus 15%
providing telephone-only access. 3 For live earnings announcement calls, the percentage of
telephone-only access increases (to 16.3%) while the percentage providing toll-free access
decreases (from 57.6% to 46.5%), suggesting that open access is made slightly more costly for
live earnings announcement calls.
We use data provided by First Call Corporation to identify closed conference calls.
First Call Corporation is a global research network targeted primarily at institutional buy- and
sell-side markets. The company provides daily lists of conference calls to its clients and also
maintains a database of conference calls for academic use. For our study, conference calls listed
on First Call (between March 1999 and June 2000) but not listed on BestCalls.com are identified
as firms hosting closed calls. It is possible that some of the conference calls on the First Call

3

Webcast calls are also simultaneously provided via the telephone in many cases. We classifY such observations as
webcasts because we are interested in the differences between web availability and telephone-only access.
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database were open to the public but not listed on the BestCalls.com database; however, any
misclassification of open calls as closed will only serve to weaken our tests. 4

3.

Determinants of the decision to provide open conference calls

3.1

Hypotheses and prior research
Prior studies examining the determinants of firms ' disclosure policies hypothesize that

firms engage in disclosure to reduce adverse selection problems and/or expected legal liability
costs (see Healy and Palepu, 200 1 and V errecchia, 200 1 for reviews of this literature).
Consistent with these theories, Lang and Lundholm ( 1993) find positive associations between
firms' overall disclosure policies (measured using analysts' ratings of disclosure practices) and
firm size, flrm performance, and recent security issuances; and negative associations with the
correlation between earnings and returns. Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999) and Tasker
(1998) focus on firms that adopt a specific type of disclosure mechanism- the corporate
conference call. Conference calls differ from traditional disclosures in that they allow managers
to expand on quarterly earnings releases, qualitatively discuss the prospects of the firm, and
respond to questions. Because of these features, Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999) predict
and fmd that firms in high-tech industries and with higher market-to-book ratios and sales
growth rates are more likely to host conference calls. Similarly, Tasker (1998) finds that firms
are more likely to host conference calls when financial statement informativeness is low.
The dramatic increase in the number of firms providing conference calls in recent years
suggests that hosting conference calls has become almost standard practice for most firms (NIRI,
1998; Bowen, Dav is, and Matsumoto, 2002). However, during our sample period, some firms

4

We called a sample of 85 firms that were listed as closed and, in each case, a member of the fin n 's investor
relations department confirmed that they did not provide open access to conference calls during our sample period.
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chose to restrict access to their conference calls to only selected analysts and large investors.
When conference call access is restricted, individual investors receive delayed information
filtered through analyst reports and the financial press. Thus, the decision to broaden access to
conference calls depends on whether managers have incentives to provide all financial statement
users (especially small investors) immediate access to unfiltered information. We test three
potential sources of managerial incentives to host open conference calls -the composition and
demands of the firm ' s investor base, the complexity of the information discussed in a conference
call, and employee demands for unfiltered information about the company. 5
Prior research has found evidence consistent with firms responding to investor demands
for greater voluntary disclosures (Frost and Pownall, 1994; Botos an and Harris, 2000).
Managers have incentives to respond to investor demands for equal access to disclosure because
reduced information asymmetry among investors can lower their cost of capital (Healy and
Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001 ). In addition, less informed investors would demand broader
dissemination practices to avoid the possibility of trading against more informed investors
(Wang, 1993). Because of the higher potential for information asymmetry among investors,
firms with a more highly dispersed investor base are likely to experience greater pressure from
shareholders to broaden their disclosure practices and are more likely to provide open conference
calls. As a measure of ownership dispersion, we use the log ofthe number of shareholders
minus the log of the mean number of shareholders in the firm 's size decile (LNOWN) (see Table
2 for detailed definitions ofvariables). 6

5

It is also possible that litigation costs could differ between open and closed calls. However, in both cases, the firm
is disclosing material information to the market. Under existing fraud-on-the-market rules, individuals can sue
regardless of whether they heard the information directly or not. Thus, litigation costs are unlikely to differ between
the two types of calls.
6
We also size-adjust this variable to ensure that it does not proxy for firm size. W e form size deciles using total
sales. We obtain similar results when we use total assets to define the size deciles and weaker results when we use
the market value of equity. In the latter case, there is a higher level of multicollinearity in our model because we
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In contrast, firms with a higher percentage of shares held by institutions and/or a higher

level of analyst following likely receive less pressure to host open calls since these capital
market participants are generally inv ited to participate in the calls (irrespectiv e of the company's
policy with regard to the general public and the media). Moreover, these information
intermediaries could actually prefer that information not be broadly disseminated because they
are concerned about either a decline in the quality of the information communicated or a loss of
their informational advantage (NIRI 2000a). Thus, firms with higher institutional ownership
and/or higher analyst following likely perceive less benefit to broadening access to their calls.
We include the percentage of institutional ownership (PIH) and level of analyst following (NAL)
to test for this effect. 7
Firms whose shares are frequently traded also likely face pressure from shareholders to
disclose information. Investors who trade frequently are concerned about liquidity (Bushee and
Noe, 2000) and broader information dissemination practices increase liquidity by reducing the
information asymmetry between investors. Thus, firms with high share turnover face stronger
demands to provide open calls. We proxy for this effect with the firm 's mean share turnover
(MTURN), measured as mean monthly trading volume deflated by mean shares outstanding
during calendar year 1999.
In addition to investor demands, the decision to broaden disclosure practices is likely

influenced by anticipated investor reactions to the information. Providing unsophisticated
investors unfiltered access to information increases the likelihood that such investors will form

include market value of equity as a control variable for size. W e follow a similar approach with the number of
employees variable (discussed later).
7
It is also possible that firms that are neglected by analysts and institutions have greater incentives to open
conference calls to individual investors to broaden their investor audience and overcome the lack of information
intermediaries (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1999). This explanation would again predict a negative relation between
opening conference calls and the percent of institutional ownership and analyst following, although for a slightly
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diverse opinions (Barron, Byard, and Enis, 2001). If these investors immediately trade based on
these opinions, the firm could experience an increase in stock price volatility. Given that the
company is under intense scrutiny by the market during the conference call, higher stock price
volatility during this period is more likely to leave the impression that the firm's stock price is
generally volatile, potentially increasing the perceived riskiness of the firm (Froot, Perold, and
Stein, 1992) and deterring investors from trading in the stock (NIRI, 1999). 8 Thus, we predict
that firms with complex information disclosures will likely prefer closed calls to ensure the
information is filtered through more sophisticated sources, such as financial analysts, reducing
the potential for misinterpretation and excess volatility. 9
We include proxies for sev eral different sources of complex financial disclosures. First,
firms with a complex business model will hav e more complicated financial disclosures because
the information required to explain current performance and to prov ide indications of future
performance is likely to be technical in nature and easy to misinterpret without training or a
background in the field. 10 As a proxy for firms with complex business models, we use an
indicator for membership in a high-tech industry (DHTECH). 11 Such firms frequently
experience rapid change and innovations that increase the complexity of the information

different reason (i.e. , to influence the type o f investor you attract rather than to respond to demands of your existing
shareholder base).
8
As an example of the level of attention that a firm receives during a conference call, a recent Washington Post
article reported that Cisco's May 2001 quarterly earnings conference call attracted 34,000 listeners (Vinzant, 2001 ).
9
Managers of firms with complex financial disclosures could also choose to restrict access due to proprietary cost
concerns. If competitors can obtain more proprietary information through listening to an open call than they could
through reading a filtered analyst report of the call, then managers wishing to disclose proprietary information have
incentives to host closed calls.
10
An alternative explanation is that firms with more complex business models would prefer to allow unsophisticated
investors access to the conference call so that they receive disclosure directly from the firms rather than filtered
through analyst r eports. This would be the case if such firms believed the filtering mechanism would either reduce
the richness/content of the information provided or potentially misinterpret the information.
11
SIC codes classified as DHTEC H include: Drugs (2833-2836); Electric Distribution Equipment (3612-3613);
Electrical Industrial Apparatus (3621-3629); Household Audio & Video Equipment (365 1-3652), Communications
Equipment (3661-3669); Electron Tubes (3671 ); Printed Circuit Boards (3672); Semiconductors & Related Devices
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provided and the difficulty in valuing the ftrm (Lev and Zarowin, 1999). We also include a
proxy for volatility in operating performance, measured as the standard deviation of the firm ' s
seasonally-differenced quarterly revenue (VREV) over the past 16 months. Volatility in
operating performance likely reflects greater unpredictability in the underlying business model
and greater difficulty in interpreting the future implications of current events.
Second, firms that participate in frequent and/or substantial financial transactions, such as
mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures, generally have more complex information to
communicate. We include the percentage of recorded intangible assets (INTAN) as a measure
of the importance of such information in the firm's reporting environment (Barth, Kasznik, and
McNichols, 2001 ). These recorded intangibles consist predominately of items created through
financial transactions (e.g., goodwill, purchased intangibles, franchises), whose valuation
implications are likely more difficult to assess than those of tangible assets such as property,
plant, and equipment.
Finally, firms with low financial statement informativeness are likely to use conference
calls as a means of supplementing mandatory accounting disclosures to communicate valuerelevant information to market participants (Tasker, 1998). Firms with low financial statement
informativeness, which Tasker (1998) defmes as the extent to which current accounting rules
capture the value of the firm, have a greater proportion oftheir value in economic assets that are
not recorded by the accounting system (e.g., the value of R&D investment, growth opportunities,
etc.). Because managers of such firms must communicate why the accounting numbers are not
reflective of firm value, while providing information that will serve such a role, they are more
likely to target their calls to sophisticated investors only. We include two proxies for the

(3674); Magnetic and Optical Recording Media (36 95); Telephone Communications ( 48 12-4822) ; Radio & T V
Broadcasting ( 4832-4899); Computer and Data Processing Services (7370-7379) .
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informativeness ofthe trrm's accounting information. First, following Tasker ( 1998), we use the
book-to-market ratio (BP). Because this measure can also proxy for risk, real options, and/or
mispricing, we include a second proxy, the industry-lev el R-square (IRSQ) from an ERC
regression of market-adjusted returns on changes in and levels of annual earnings (Francis and
Schipper, 1999; Matsumoto, 2002).

12

The lower the book-to-market ratio and the industry-level

R-square, the more difficult it is to assess the valuation implications of the ftrm 's mandatory
disclosures. 13 In summary, we predict that firms in high-tech industries and firms with higher
revenue volatility, a greater proportion of intangible assets, a low er book-to-market ratio, and a
lower industry-lev el R-square will be less likely to provide open calls to investors.
In addition to reducing the cost of capital, firms can also potentially reduce transactions

costs with other stakeholders by broadening disclosure to these user groups. Miller and Piotroski
(2000) find that ftrms with large numbers of employees provide more v oluntary disclosure to
communicate an expected increase in performance prior to its recognition in an earnings
announcement. They argue that, as the employee base grows more diffuse, internal
communication mechanisms are viewed as less credible, especially when a manager's credibility
is in question due to recent poor performance. In such a case, external disclosures are important
to employees as a source of credible information about the firm, increasing the manager's
incentives to prov ide open calls. While most firms in our sample are not currently facing such
credibility issues, informal discussions with investor relations officers indicate that employees
frequently listen to conference calls and view them as a useful forum for learning about issues

12

We use an industry-specific measure because computing firm-specific R-squares would greatly reduce the sample
size. Moreover, Biddle and Seow ( 1990) fmd that industry membership explains much of the fmn-specific variation
in ERC' s. We compute the R-square using observations from the prior three fiscal years (1997-9).
13
Low financial statement informativeness is likely related to both complex business models and the level of
financial transactions (e.g. mergers, divestitures). However, the correlations between BP, IRSQ, and our proxies for
these other measures of complexity (see Panel C of Table 3) indicate that each variable captures a somewhat
different form of complex fmancial disclosure.
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facing the firm. This suggests that firms with larger numbers of employees, relative to other
firms their size, face greater incentives to host open calls. We use the log of the number of
employees minus the log ofthe mean number of employees in the f"rrm's size decile as a proxy
for employee demand for credible information (LNEMP).
Finally, we include two additional variables to control for other possible determinants of
firms ' disclosure practices. We include firm size, measured as the log of the firms ' market value
(LMV), because prior work has found that firm size is related to disclosure practices (Lang and
Lundholm, 1993; Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner, 1999). We also include the age of the f"rrm
(LTIME), measured as the log ofthe number of months the f"rrm has been listed on CRSP,
because younger firms are likely to hav e less entrenched disclosure policies and hence could be
more inclined to adopt new technologies.
The prior discussion does not distinguish between open conference calls provided via
webcasts and those prov ided via telephone access only. Webcasts potentially allow broader
access to information because, as Table 1 indicates, a majority of telephone dial-in numbers are
not toll-free for earnings-related conference calls. Thus, the individual must bear some cost in
order to listen to such calls. In addition, webcasts are potentially more visible to individual
investors who are attuned to fmding and receiving information via the Internet because of on-line
trading. To provide descriptive evidence on any potential differences between these two
methods of providing open calls, we also separately analyze the choice to provide webcast versus
telephone-only access.
The prior discussion also assumes the firm's shareholder structure and business
complexity are exogenously determined; i.e., managers decide on the optimal disclosure strategy
given their current environment. It is possible, particularly in the case of shareholder structure,
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that disclosure strategies partially determine these ftrm characteristics. As with most empirical
studies, it is difficult to infer causality from association tests. In sensitivity analyses, we attempt
to investigate this issue by examining the effect on our results of using lagged independent
variables and contemporaneous changes in determinants in our analysis. Nevertheless, we
recognize the limitations of this analysis in determining causality and our results should be
interpreted accordingly.

3.2

Results

3.2.1

Univariate analysis
For our determinants analysis, we classify each firm as prov iding open or closed

conference calls based on calls made during 1999-2000. Firms that initially appear on the First
Call database as closed calls but subsequently appear on the BestCalls.com database with open
calls are classified as open call firms for the purpose of this analysis. No ftrm switched from
open calls to closed calls.
We obtain data for our explanatory variables from the 1999 CRSP Monthly and Daily
Files, the 1999 Compustat Annual and Quarterly Data Files, the Spectrum database of
institutional holdings, and the IBES database of analysts' earnings forecasts. We measure the
variables using the most recent fiscal year provided on Compustat (ftscal years ended June 1999
-May 2000) and from the calendar year 1999 for CRSP, Spectrum, and IBES (see Table 2). The
ftnal sample includes 3,274 firms: 1,799 that host open calls and 1,475 that host closed calls.
Table 3, Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the ftrm characteristics of open and
closed call ftrms. Although we use logged values for some variables in our primary analysis
(LNOWN, LNEMP, LMV, L TIME), we report raw values in this table for ease of interpretation.

13

In univariate comparisons of open and closed call firms, all of the proxies for shareholder
demands are significantly different in the predicted direction (e.g., greater number of
shareholders, lower institutional ownership, lower analyst following, and higher share turnover
for open call ftrms ). Among the proxies for complexity of information and demands of other
stakeholders, only the proxy for financial transaction complexity (recorded intangibles) is
significant in the predicted direction; differences for the other proxies are either insignificant or
contrary to our predictions. However, Panel C of Table 3 shows that many of the v ariables are
significantly correlated with the control variables (LMV and LTllvffi) and the other explanatory
variables. Thus, it is difficult to draw conclusions based solely on the univariate analysis. 14
Panel B of Table 3 provides mean and median comparisons between firms prov iding
webcasts and those prov iding telephone-only access. In this sample of 1,799 open call firms,
1,575 firms provide webcasts and 224 f"rrms provide telephone-only access . Firms using
webcasts tend to hav e lower institutional ownership and higher share turnover than telephoneonly firms, consistent with webcasts being a more accessible form of open call for individual
investors. In addition, webcast frrms tend to be younger f"rrms in high-tech industries with lower
industry R-squares from an ERC regression. However, none of the other variables are
significantly different between webcast and telephone-only frrms.

3.2.2

Logit analysis
We model the probability of hosting an open versus a closed conference call as a function

of the above-mentioned firm characteristics using a logistic regression:

14
To test for the presence of harmful multicollinearity, we sequentially estimate the logit model with one variable
omitted each time. None of the significant results change when variables are dropped from the model. We also
estimate the model using OLS and compute variance inflation factors (VIF's). None of the VIF' s are greater than
1.6, suggesting that our results are not affected by harmful multicollinearity (for which Kennedy, 1998, cites a
benchmark VIF of 10).

14

Prob(Open) = F ( /3 0 + /31 LNOWN, + /3 2 PIH, + /33 NAL, + /3 4M TURN, + /3 5 VREV. + /36 BJJ. ( )
1
+ /37 1RSQ, + /38 1NTAN, + /39 DHTECH, + /310 LNEMJJ. + /311 LMV. + /312 LTIME, + s.)
f3 'X

where F(f3' X ) = e p·x
1+ e

Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. Coefficients and p-v alues (two-tailed) are
reported in the first column. An estimate of the marginal impact represented by the coefficient is
presented in the second column. This estimate represents the change in probability of providing
an open call that results from mov ing from the first to third quartile of each independent
v ariable's distribution. It is computed by multiplying the v ariable's interquartile range by the
effect of a one-unit change in the variable suggested by the coefficient. 15
Firms with higher institutional ownership (PIH) are significantly less likely to prov ide
open calls. This factor is the strongest determinant of open v ersus closed calls w ith a 0.129
difference in probability between the first and third quartiles of its distribution. Firms with more
disperse ownership (relative to other firms their size) (LNOWN), lower analyst follow ing
(N AL), and higher share turnover (M TURN) are also significantly more likely to prov ide open
calls. These results support the prediction that investor demands for open access to conference
calls influence the likelihood of prov iding open calls.
We find mixed evidence that firms with more complex financial disclosures are less
likely to host open calls. Supporting this prediction, firms with higher lev els of reported
intangibles (IN TAN) are significantly less likely to prov ide open calls, indicating that firms with
a high level of financial transactions prefer the information to be filtered through analysts. In

15

The effect of a one-unit change in an independent variable is calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficient
by e 13 'X /(1 + e 13 'X ) 2 , where WX is computed at the mean values of independent variables (Greene, 2000). For the
indicator variable DHTECH, the marginal impact is the di fference in probability when the variable equals one
versus when it equals zero, evaluated at the mean of the other variables.
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addition, the coefficient on the industry-level R-square (IRSQ) is positive and marginally
significant (p-value = 0.066), consistent with firms restricting access to calls when financial
statement informativeness is low. However, our other proxy for financial statement
informativeness-the book-to-price ratio (BP)-is not significantly related to providing open
calls, possibly due to the fact that conference call firms tend to have relatively high market-tobook ratios (Tasker, 1998; Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner, 1999). Contrary to our predictions,
firms with greater volatility of revenue (VREV) and firms in high tech industries (DHTECH) are
more likely to host open calls. This finding suggests that, for firms with complex business
models, the benefits of directly communicating to all investors the supplemental information
needed to interpret the firm's recent earnings performance outweigh the costs of unsophisticated
investors misinterpreting the information.
We also fmd an insignificant association between the number of employees, relative to
firm size, (LNEMP) and the decision to host open calls, suggesting that the decision to provide
open calls is not impacted by the need to credibly communicate to employees. This fmding is
likely due to the fact that the decision to prov ide open calls is a policy choice, while the need to
credibly communicate to employees varies with firm performance. Both control variables, firm
size (LMV) and time listed (LTIME) are not significantly associated with the decision to provide
open calls.
Overall, the model has statistically significant explanatory power (X2= 217.3, p-value <
0.001). Using a 50% cut-off point to classify firms (i.e., classifying firms with predicted values
>50% as "open calls") correctly classifies firms as open 66% of the time. A naive model that
classifies all firms as open is correct 55% ofthe time (1,799-;- 3,274 =55%). Thus, significant
differences exist between open and closed call firms.
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In the third and fourth column of Table 4, we examine whether our variables explain the

probability of providing open conference calls via webcasts versus providing telephone-only
access. The results suggest that not only are rmns with higher institutional ownership (PIH) and
higher analyst following (N AL) less likely to provide open calls, when they do make them
av ailable, it is generally done via telephone, which is a less " individual investor friendly" method
of dissemination. Younger firms (LTHvffi) are significantly more likely to use a web cast,
possibly because these firms are more inclined to embrace new technology. Finally, larger firms
(U vfV) are more likely to use webcasts, perhaps the result of more active investor relations
departments. 16

3. 2.3

Sensitivity analyses
As mentioned earlier, the fact that our explanatory variables are measured

contemporaneously with the conference calls raises the possibility of endogeneity between the
decision to provide open calls and our determinants variables. In other words, the significant
associations documented abov e could reflect managers making the decision to host open
conference calls based on pre-existing firm characteristics and/or firm characteristics changing in
response to the decision to host open calls.
To provide more evidence on whether the initial decision to provide open calls is a result
of pre-ex isting firm characteristics, we estimate the logit regression with lagged values of the
explanatory variables, measured using fiscal year 1997 Compustat and CRSP data and PIH and
NAL at the end of 1997. Because most firms began providing open calls relatively recently,
16
The web vs. phone analysis omits firms that held closed calls, creating a potential selection bias in this test.
Ideally, we would address this problem with a nested multinomiallogit model to jointly estimate the open vs. closed
decision with the web vs. phone decision. How ever, the model does not converge, likely due to the small number of
observati ons that provide phone-only access . Instead, we estimate a multinomiallogit with three ordered groups:
web, phone, and closed. The results are similar to the open vs. closed results. We also separately estimate web vs.
closed and phone-only vs. closed. The web vs. closed results are similar to the open vs. closed results, whereas only
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these lagged variables likely represent firm characteristics in place prior to the decision to
provide open calls. For the open vs. closed call decision, our results are essentially the same in
sign and significance level as in Table 4, except for LNOWN and DHTECH, which are
insignificant. These findings suggest that our results are not solely driven by changes in
determinants after the decision to provide open calls was made, but rather reflect firm
characteristics in place prior to the decision.
N ext, we examine the extent to which our results reflect changes in firm characteristics
after 1997. We estimate the logit model with the open vs. closed decision modeled as a function
of changes in the firm characteristics between 1997 and 1999 (with the exception ofthe change
in time listed, which we dropped because it would be the same for all firms). The results indicate
that open call firms experience smaller increases in institutional ownership and number of
employees and larger increases in market value than closed call firms between 1997 and 1999.
No other change variables are significant. Thus, with the possible exception ofPIH, it is
unlikely that the results in Table 4 are driven by changes in firm characteristics subsequent to the
decision to host open calls. While these analyses do not formally correct for any statistical
biases due to endogeneity, they do provide additional evidence that managers made the decision
to host open calls based on pre-existing firm characteristics.
We also examine the potential impact ofthe small number offmns (350) that switch
from closed calls to open calls during the sample period. Recall that these "switching firms" are
considered open call firms for the purpose of the primary analysis. We estimate the logit model
with 1) switching firms deleted from the analysis, 2) switching firms considered closed call firms
instead of open call firms, 3) a multinomial model that placed switching frrms as a separate

MTURN and LTIME are significant in the phone vs. closed model. Overall, the small number offmns that are
telephone only limits the power of any separate analysis of this decision.
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group between firms that are always open and those that are always closed. The results are
essentially the same as our primary analysis. Thus, our results are not sensitive to our
classification of the firms that switched disclosure policy during the sample period.
We further examine the firms that switch to determine whether the change in disclosure
policy is due to changes in firm characteristics or to the late adoption of open call technology.
First, we estimate two cross-sectionallogit models similar to Table 4 to examine how switching
firms differ from firms that are open or closed throughout the sample period. Second, we
estimate logit regressions to compare yearly changes in the explanatory variables between
switching firms and firms that remain closed throughout (i.e. did not choose to switch). 17
Overall, the results of these analyses indicate that switching firms are 1) between open and
closed firms on many key firm characteristics, 2) generally larger in size than both open and
closed call firms, and 3) not experiencing changes in determinants different than those for closed
firms. We interpret this evidence as indicating that switching firms are merely large firms that
are late adopters of open call technology rather than firms that change their policy in response to
a dramatic change in firm characteristics.

4.

Market effects of open conference calls

4.1

Hypotheses and prior research

17

An important problem with examining changes in determinants for switching firms is that we do not know when
the decision was made to switch to open calls. Ideally, we would want to measure changes in determinants leading
up to the decision to switch. However, our data only provides the date on which the first open call was made, which
could be one or two quarters after the decision to switch was made. Another problem is that we have a fairly short
time-series of observations ( 16 months) while many of our determinants are only available on an annual basis.
These problems reduce our power to detect any short-term changes in determinants that trigger a decision to switch.
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We examine the impact of open calls on three metrics of trading behavior during the call
period: trade size, price volatility, and trading volume. This analysis is conducted at the
individual conference call level, using only calls conducted during trading hours.
Open conference calls allow smaller investors greater access to information about the
firm. During the period when conference calls were generally restricted to larger shareholders
and sell-side analysts, Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999) find ev idence consistent with
conference calls placing smaller investors at an informational disadvantage. Regulation FD was
specifically implemented to address small investors ' concerns by eliminating selective disclosure
of material information to certain capital market participants. However, to date, there has been
little evidence that individuals' trading behavior is a function of their access to conference calls.
We investigate whether open calls result in greater trading activity by smaller investors,
relativ e to closed calls. We define the percentage of small trades (SMTRADE) as the number of
small trades during the call period divided by the total number of trades during the period (see
Table 2 for variable definitions). Following Lee (1992), w e obtain the firm 's opening price at
the beginning of the trading period and compute the largest number of round lot shares that is
less than or equal to $10,000. We define a small trade as any trade less than or equal to this lot
size. 18 If prov iding direct access to information encourages trading by individual investors, we
would expect to see a larger number of small trades in open call periods compared to closed call
periods.
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We use a dollar-value definition because proxies based solely on trade lot size do not reflect differences in stock
prices (Lee, 1992; Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000; Bhattacharya, 2001). However, we conducted the analysis using a
cut-off of 1,000 shares for small trades (as in Cready, 1988) and found similar results. We also conducted the
analysis using a $5,000 threshold and our results are qualitatively similar, although somewhat weaker. The lower
threshold results in a significant number of zero observations because of the limited trading period (75 minutes)
being investigated. Zero observations are particularly problematic for our changes analysis (see 4. 2.2).
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We also examine the effect of open conference calls on price volatility and trading
volume. Although managers have expressed concerns over potential increases in volatility and
trading volume as a result of allowing individuals access to their calls, empirical evidence of
such an increase has not been previously demonstrated. 19 Prior analytical research suggests that
greater informedness is associated with greater price volatility and trading volume during an
information release (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1990). Allowing a larger number of investors
immediate access to new information through open calls should increase the overall level of
informedness during the calls. This effect is supported by Barron, Byard, and Enis (2001), who
find that non-professional investors use and interpret disclosures differently than professionals,
providing a richer set of analyses to the market. These findings suggest that the informedness
effect of open calls should result in increased price volatility and trading volume.
Providing open calls could also affect the degree of consensus among market
participants. If indiv iduals are less likely to draw similar conclusions from information
presented during conference calls, open calls could exhibit less consensus among participants
than closed calls, which cater to a more homogeneous audience (Barron, Byard, and Enis, 2001).
Less consensus during open calls should produce higher trading volume, reinforcing the
informedness effect (Barron, 1995; Bamber and Cheon, 1995; Bamber, Barron, and Stober,
1997). It should also result in lower volatility, contrary to the informedness effect (Holthausen
and Verrecchia, 1990). However, while the consensus among those receiving information is
likely higher for closed calls v ersus open calls, it is not clear that the consensus among all market
participants is higher during closed calls since indiv idual investors are essentially prov ided with
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As a recent Investor Relations Business article states: "The problem is not so much that the public won' t
understand the scope of information companies are forced to release, but they will sell their shares as a result of it."
(IRB Staff, 2000). This concern over the ability of small investors to process complex financial information is not
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no information during these calls. To the extent that uninformed indiv idual investors trade
during a closed call period, the degree of consensus could actually be lower during a closed call
period than during an open call period, where all traders have access to the same information.
Because uninformed trading by individual inv estors during a closed call is likely to mitigate the
differences in consensus between open and closed calls, we expect the informedness effect to
dominate, resulting in an increase in both trading volume and volatility during open calls.
We examine the association between open calls and two measures of price v olatility. The
first is the difference between the highest and lowest price during the conference call period,
scaled by the low price (HI_LO) (similar to the measure in Wiggins, 1991 and Frankel, Johnson,
and Skinner, 1999). The second measure is the coefficient of variation; i.e. the standard
deviation of price scaled by the mean price during the conference call window (CVPRC). We
examine the association between open calls and trading volume using the log of total shares
traded during the conference call window (LTVOL), consistent with Frankel, Johnson, and
Skinner ( 1999).

4. 2

Results

4. 2.1

Descriptive Statistics
For our analysis ofthe effects of open conference calls on trading behav ior, we first

identify the scheduled start of the conference call from the BestCalls.com and First Call
databases. Following Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999), we define the conference call
period as beginning 15 minutes prior to the scheduled start of the call and ending 60 minutes

new. Similar concerns motivated the SEC's proposal to allow two-tiered financial reporting (see Bushman, Gigler,
and Indjejikian, 1996).
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after the start. 2 Figure 1 provides a timeline that depicts the measurement period. Using data
from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, we measure each of our variables - SMTRADE,
HI_LO, CVPRC, and LTV OL- during this period (see Table 2).
Table 5, Panel A presents descriptiv e statistics on the mean and median market effects of
open and closed conference calls. Open calls hav e a significantly higher percentage of small
trades during the call period (trades less than $10,000) than closed calls (66% versus 58%),
suggesting a higher level of trading activity b y small investors in open calls. To prov ide further
descriptive evidence, we examine the proportion of medium trades OvfDTRADE), def"med as
trades between $10,000 and $50,000, and large trades (LGTRADE), defined as trades greater
than $50,000. Both of these trade sizes are significantly greater for closed calls than for open
calls, indicating that larger inv estors are more active traders during closed call periods. N ext,
Panel A shows that both the difference between the high and low price (HI_LO) during the
conference call window and the coefficient of variation of price (CVPRC) are significantly
higher when calls are open rather than closed. How ever, trading volume (LTVOL) during the
conference call period is significantly higher for closed calls than for open calls during the call
period. Thus, the descriptive statistics indicate that open call firms hav e higher price v olatility
and lower trading volume during conference call periods.
Panel B of Table 5 presents means and medians for open conference calls that are
webcast and those that are provided via telephone only. The panel shows few significant
differences between the two methods of providing open calls, with the exception of a higher
median CVPRC and lower median LGTRADE for w ebcasts.
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The database only provides a scheduled beginning time. It is possible that some calls start prior to the scheduled
time. Thus, we begin the period 15 minutes prior to ensure we capture the beginning of the call period. The
database does not provide an ending time. However, anecdotal evidence in Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner ( 1999)
suggests that most calls are completed within 60 minutes.
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4.2.2

Changes analysis
Our previous analysis of the determinants of open conference calls suggests that there are

differences in firm characteristics between firms that provide open calls and firms that do not.
We use two approaches to control for these differences when comparing market reactions
between open and closed calls. First, we conduct a changes analysis that uses the firm as its own
control. Second, we use maximum likelihood estimation to jointly estimate the determinants of
the decision to host open or closed calls with the market effects during the call period.
In the changes analysis, we compute the value of each of the variables during a control

period and subtract this amount from the value computed during the conference call window. 21
The control period used is approximately the same 75-minute period on the prev ious trading day
(see figure 1). 22 Panel A of Table 6 presents tests of differences in mean and median changes in
market effect v ariables between open and closed calls. Tests of means are based on two-sample
t-tests with adjustments for unequal variances where appropriate. Tests of medians are based on
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. All p-v alues are two-tailed. The panel shows that the average
increase in small trades (L1SMTRADE) is 10.1 %, which is significantly greater than the 1.4%
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A difference in the proportion of small trades (SMTRADE) during the conference call and control periods could
be due to either a change in the number of small trades or a change in the number of total trades. Accordingly, we
compute a percentage change in small trades between the two periods (~SMTRADE), defined as the number of
small trades during the conference call window less the number of small trades during the control window, divided
by the number of small trades during the call window. The variables ~MDTRADE and ~LG TRADE are defined
similarly.
22
We do not use either of the two 75-minute periods immediately preceding the call period as the control because
these periods are not available for calls early in the trading day and because the release of the earnings
announcement often happens in these periods. However, the results are similar, though slightly weaker, if we do use
these periods as controls. We also used approximately the same 75-minute period one week prior and the median of
all 75-minute periods during the trading day one week prior as control periods, in addition to periods subsequent to
the call period ( +2, +3, +4, and + 19). We obtain the same results in terms of signs and significance using these
control periods.
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increase in small trades for closed calls. This result suggests that individual investors exploit
their access to information in open calls by trading during the call period.
An examination of medium and large trades sizes (LlMDTRADE and &GTRADE)
indicates a large percentage increase in both these trade size groups for open and closed calls,
consistent with the results of Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999) that trade size increases
during conference calls. However, the differences between open and closed calls are not
significant. Thus, while closed calls have a significantly higher level of medium and large trade
sizes relativ e to open calls, the change in medium and large trades during the call period is not
significantly different between the two groups.
The volatility of price also increases during conference call periods (compared to the
control period), but more so for open calls than for closed calls. Changes in the magnitude of the
difference between high and low prices (MU_LO) and the coefficient ofv ariation (LlCVPRC)
are both significantly higher for open calls than for closed calls. 23 Finally, the change in total
volume (&TV OL) does not increase to a greater extent during open v ersus closed calls. Using
the Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) model, these results suggest that open calls are associated
with more informedness and greater consensus, as these two effects unambiguously produce
higher v olatility, but result in conflicting effects on volume. The greater consensus during open
calls likely stems from the fact that open calls allow everyone to form opinions based on the
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The finding of higher volatility for open calls raises the question of whether the volatility is due to overreactions
by unsophisticated investors, consistent with the concerns of some managers (IRB Staff, 2000; NIRI, 2000b). It is
not apparent what form the "overreaction" would take (i.e. when the negative autocorrelation in returns should
appear), so we test for negative autocorrelation in returns on a trade-by-trade basis within the call period and
between the call period as a whole and subsequent 75-minute periods during the day and into the next day. In no
case do we find significant negative autocorrelation in returns for either open call firms or closed call firms. Thus, it
is likely that the greater volatility observed during open call periods reflects changes in informedness and consensus
in price formation rather than overreaction by small traders.
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same information release, whereas closed calls force individual investors to form opinions based
on pre-call information only.
Panel B of Table 6 tests for differences in mean and median changes in market effect
variables between webcast and telephone-only calls. If the method by which a firm makes their
call broadly av ailable impacts individual investor participation in the call, the effects on trading
behavior will differ between the two methods. The panel shows that none of the market effect
variables are significantly different between webcast and telephone-only conference calls.
However, given the relatively small number of observations with telephone-only access, the lack
of results could be due to a lack of power.

4. 2.3 Maximum Likelihood Estim ation
As discussed previously, the fact that firms choose whether to provide open or closed
calls could lead to a potential self-selection bias. Such a bias could indicate that firms with open
calls would have higher lev els of inter-day price variation and small trades even absent the
choice to host open calls.24 In the prior section, we control for this potential bias by subtracting
the level of the same variable measured 24 hours prior to the conference call, using the firm as its
own control. However, if the self-selection w ere associated with differing levels ofthese
variables during the conference calls, but not at any other time, our changes methodology would
not provide an effective control for this self-selection.
To control for self-selection, we use full information max imum likelihood estimation
(M LE) (see Greene, 1998 and 2000; Kennedy, 1998). This analysis jointly estimates the
decision to provide open calls (the selection model) and the effect of open calls on our market
effects variables (the market effects m odel). This joint estimation is performed separately for
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each of our market effect variables: SMTRADE, MDTRADE, LGTRADE, HI_LO, CVPRC, and
LTVOL. Because we have only one observation for the selection model for each firm , we use
the average of the market effect v ariables across all call observations for firms with more than
one conference call. 25 We weight the MLE to reflect such averaging. This test's data
requirements reduce our sample to 1,380 f"rrm-call observations, of which 680 are open calls and
700 are closed calls. The main reason for the reduction in the number of firm observations is
that the determinants sample in Table 4 includes all live open and closed calls related to earnings
announcements while the market effects sample uses only live conference calls held during
trading hours.
The selection model includes all of the variables used in the determinants test (see
equation (1)). The market effects variables are modeled as a function of an indicator variable
(OCALL) that equals one if the call is open and equals zero otherwise, as well as those
determinants variables that could possibly hav e a direct effect on trading. We identify the
following variables with the potential to directly affect our trading variables: number of owners
(LNOWN), share turnover (MTURN), institutional ownership (PIH), book-to-price ratio (BP),
and f"rrm size (LMV). The remaining variables are unlikely to have a direct effect on trading
patterns. The indirect effect of all the determinants variables is captured in the joint estimation
process (e.g., the effect of analyst following on the decision to host open calls and its resulting
impact on trade size).
Table 7 presents the MLE estimation results. We present only the market effects model
because the results of each jointly-estimated selection model are similar to those reported in
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For example, this could be the case if these firms systematically choose disclosure policies that, in general, lead to
high levels of these variables. Maddala (1986) and Greene (2000) provide thorough discussions of the causes and
implications of self-selection biases.
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Table 4. 26 Panel A presents the results using the level ofthe dependent variables while Panel B
presents the results using the change in the dependent variables from the control period (as
described in section 4.2.2). The results ofthese analyses are similar to those reported earlier.
Open calls are associated with a significantly greater proportion of small trades and a
significantly greater increase in small trades during the call period. The level of price volatility
is significantly higher during open calls relative to closed calls; however, the change in price
volatility is only marginally higher during open calls relative to closed calls (p-v alue = 0.073
two-tailed, or 0.037 one-tailed, in the MU_ LO model and p-v alue = 0.125 two-tailed, or 0.063
one-tailed, in the LlCVPRC model). Finally, both the level of and the change in trading volume
is not significantly different between open and closed calls.
We also ran this analysis on the comparison ofwebcast and telephone-only open calls.
Similar to our initial analysis, we do not find significantly higher proportions of small trades,
price volatility, or trading v olume for calls that are webcast versus calls that are provided on a
telephone-only basis (not reported).

4. 2.4

Sensitivity Analysis
We perform a number of sensitivity checks on the above analysis (not reported). To

ensure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of control variables included in the market
effects model, we also perform the estimation with 1) the full set of determinants variables
repeated as control variables in the market effects model and 2) no control variables in the
market effects model. With the full set of controls repeated in the market effects model, the
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We also performed the analysis using a randomly-selected conference call observation for each firm and using all
call observations. These alternative approaches yielded similar results.
26
The only exceptions are VREV and LMV. The coefficient on VREV is generally insignificant (as opposed to
being positive and significant as in Table 4) and the coefficient on LM V is positive and significant (as opposed to
being insignificant) . These two variables are highly correlated with other variables in the model and it is likely that
multicollinearity has a greater impact in the smaller sample.
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l'v1LE yields similar results for all market effects except for LGTRADE, where the MLE did not
converge. With no controls in the market effects model, the MLE yields similar results for all
market effects except for mr_LO and

~CVPRC,

where the MLE did not converge. In the three

cases where the MLE did not converge, we use the Heckman two-step procedure (see Greene
1998, 2000) and rmd similar results to those presented in Table 7. 27
Puhani (2000) reviews the simulation literature on joint estimation of selection models
and concludes that, in the presence of multicollinearity, OLS provides more robust estimates
than either the MLE or Heckman estimators. We compute the v ariance inflation factors (VIF's)
for each regression and find no instances ofVIF 's greater than 2.2, suggesting that
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in our sample. N evertheless, we estimate each of
the market effects models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and find similar results.
N ext, we investigate whether the decision to provide open calls is m ade opportunistically
based on the expected market reaction to the disclosure. As mentioned earlier, no firms switch
from open calls to closed calls during our sample period, suggesting that the decision to provide
open calls is "sticky." Howev er, firms could opportunistically shift their conference calls in or
out of trading hours depending on the news they hav e to disclose. We find that over 80% of our
sample firms host calls either always during trading hours or always during nontrading hours.
Thus, the choice to prov ide calls during trading hours also appears to be a sticky policy choice.
As an additional test, we estimate our market effects tests for only those rrrms that always held
their calls during trading hours and the results are consistent with those reported earlier. Overall,
we find little evidence that managers opportunistically choose the time and level of access to
their calls based on the expected market reaction to the disclosure.
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An alternative approach to MLE is to estimate the market effects model with 2SLS using the fitted probabilities
from the probit disclosure model as an instrumental variable (Greene 1998, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). This
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Finally, we consider whether open and closed calls differ in their information content.
Measuring information content is problematic because we cannot directly measure what new
information is released during the call or whether the information is better or worse than
expected. As a proxy for the information content, we examine raw stock returns and squared
stock returns during the call period. We find no significant difference in raw returns between
open and closed calls, suggesting that there are no systematic differences in the type of news
(good or bad) released between open and closed calls. We find significantly higher average
squared returns for open calls than for closed calls, suggesting greater information content in
open calls, contrary to what would be expected if managers are withholding information during
open calls due to liability or proprietary information concerns. However, this measure is
confounded by the amount of volatility in the stock price, which Tables 5 and 6 indicate is higher
in the case of open calls. We separately include the raw return and the squared return as controls
in the maximum likelihood estimation and find no significant differences in the results,
suggesting that differences in information content are not driving the results .

5.

Summary and conclusions
Recent innovations in information technology have enabled companies to provide all

investors real-time access to conference calls that were previously accessible only by a select
group of investment professionals. We investigate the determinants ofthe choice to provide
open conference calls at a firm's quarterly earnings announcement. Our results indicate that
firms providing open conference calls tend to have a greater number of stockholders (relative to
firms of similar size), lower institutional ownership, lower analyst following, and higher average
share turnover than firms providing calls to a more restricted audience ("closed" calls).

approach yields similar results for all analyses.
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Moreover, when firms with lower institutional ownership and lower analyst following do allow
open access to their calls, they are less likely to make them av ailable v ia webcast, an arguably
broader information dissemination method. These findings are consistent with firms providing
open conference calls to meet nonprofessional shareholders ' demands to make information
widely available.
M oreover, we find that firms with higher recorded intangible assets are less likely to
provide open calls, consistent with firms having more complex rmancial information targeting
their disclosures to more sophisticated users. Firms in industries with low R-squares from an
annual ERC regression are also less likely to provide open calls, suggesting that firms with low
financial statement informativeness are more likely to restrict the access of unsophisticated
investors. Howev er, our other proxy for financial statement informativeness, the book-to-price
ratio, is not significantly related to the decision to provide open calls, possibly due to the fact that
conference call firms tend to have relatively high market-to-book ratios (Tasker, 1998; Frankel,
Johnson, and Skinner, 1999). We find that firms with greater rev enue volatility and firms in
high-tech industries are more likely to provide open calls, contrary to our prediction that firms
with more complex business models would want their conference call disclosures filtered
through sophisticated analysts and investors. Finally, we find no significant relation betw een the
decision to provide open calls and employee demands for information.
The results from the determinants test must be interpreted w ith some caution due to the
potential endogeneity between the decision to host open calls and the firm characteristics.
However, these results are generally robust to a number of sensitivity checks. R esults using
lagged values of the firm characteristics are essentially the same, suggesting that the decision to
host open conference calls is associated with firm characteristics in place before the decision was

31

made. In addition, changes in determinants are generally not statistically different between open
and closed call firms, indicating that the results are not driven by changes in firm characteristics
after the decision to host open calls was made.
N ext, we examine the impact that such calls have on trading behav ior and price
movements during the conference call period. Prior research finds that average trade size
increases during conference calls, suggesting that larger investors trade during these calls
(Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner, 1999). Our results suggest that open calls are associated with a
greater percentage increase in small trades (trades of less than $10,000), consistent with
individual investors exploiting their opportunity to trade in real-time based on information
released during open calls. We also find that open calls are associated with higher price
volatility, but not with the level of trading volume. These results suggest that providing
individual investors access to conference calls increases both the amount of informedness and
consensus in the market
Overall, our findings suggest that broadening access to information is a strategic decision
made by managers. Providing wider access to disclosure not only enables individual investors
to immediately trade based on the information, consistent with the SEC's desire to provide a
"level playing field," but also increases price variability during the period. As new technologies
continue to develop, managers will be faced with similar decisions regarding the costs and
benefits of pursuing new av enues of information dissemination (e.g., e-mail alerts, real-time
access to financial statements, etc.). Our fmdings shed some light on the possible factors that
could influence such decisions and the potential impact of these decisions on the market
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Figure 1
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1

The conference call period is defined based on the period used in Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics on open conference calls from BestCalls.com database

Panel A : Op_en con[!rence calls b)!_ f_lp_e and b)!_ live vs. rep_lal
Stated Reason for Call
Earnings Announcement (EA)
Special Conference
Analyst Interview
Shareholder Meeting
Management Interview
Business or Product News
Other
Total Calls

All Calls
8,789
318
134
71
318
178

___g
9,889

Live Calls
4,158
154
3
31
128
80
___ll
4,585

ReElayed Calls
4,631
164
131
40
190
98
___jQ
5,304

Panel B: Open conference calls by method of accesi
Method of access
Webcast
Company website
Vcal1
StreetFusion
Other provider
Telephone-only
Toll-free number
Toll access only

All Calls
8,431 (85.3%)
573 (6.8%)
4,241 (50.3%)
1,110 (13.2%)
2,507 (29.7%)
1,458 (14.7%)

All EA Calls
7,390 (84.1%)
535 (7.2%)
3,798 (51.4%)
1,096 (14.8%)
1,961 (26.5%)
1,399 (15.!f>/o)

1

3,483 (83. 7%)
242 (6.9%)
1,869 (53. 7%)
458 (13.1%)
914 (26.2%)
675 (16.3%)

803 (5 7.4%)
596 (42.6%)

840 (57.6%)
618 (42.4%)

Live EA Calls

314 (46.5%)
361 (53.5%)

This table includes all conference calls listed by BestCall.com that were held between 3/1/1999 and 6/30/2000. Open conference calls are defined as calls that
provide unlimited access to the call. Live calls provide real-time access, whereas replayed calls are recorded and made available after the live broadcast is over.
2
Webcast calls are provided via the Internet and may also be simultaneously provided via telephone. Telephone-only calls are only available by calling into
either a toll-free or toll access number. Vcall and StreetFusion are companies that broadcast webcasts from their website.
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Table 2
Definitions ofvariables
Panel A : Hypothesized Determinants of Open Conference Calls

Institutional ovmership
Analyst following
Mean share turnover

Variable
Name
NOWN
(LNOWN)
PIH
NAL
MTURN

Volatility of quarterly revenues
Book-to-price ratio
Industry ERC R-square

VREV
BP
IRSQ

Percentage of intangible assets
Membership in high-tech
industry
Number of employees

INTAN
DHTECH

Variable
Number of shareholders

Firm size (control variable)
Age of firm (control variable)

NEMP
(LNEMP)
MV
(LMV)
TIME
(LTIME)

Definition/ Source1
(Log of) Compustat item #100 at end of fiscal year - (Log of) mean number of shareholders in
same size decile as firm
Shares held by institutions from Spectrum + total shares from CRSP at end of year
Largest monthly number of analyst earnings estimates during year (IBES)
Mean monthly trading volume divided by average shares outstanding over the 12 month period
January 1999 - December 1999 (CRSP)
Standard deviation of quarterly revenue over 16 quarters (Quarterly Compustat item # 2)
Book value (Compustat item #60) + Market value (Compustat item # 25 X# 24)
R-square from a regression of market adjusted returns on annual change in earnings and level of
earnings (both deflated by prior price) estimated by 2-digit SIC over the fiscal years 1997-1999
Intangible assets (Compustat item #33) + Total assets (Compustat item #6)
SIC Codes: 2833-36, 3612-13, 3621-29, 3651-52, 3661-69, 3671-2, 3674, 3695, 4812-22, 483299, 7370-79
(Log of) Compustat item #29 at end of fiscal year - (Log of) mean number of employees in
same size decile as firm
(Log of) market value of equity (Compustat item # 25 x # 24)
(Log of) the number of months listed on CRSP

Predicted
Association
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
?
?

Panel B: Hypothesized Effects of Open Conference Calls
Predicted
Association
Definition/ Source
Positive
Number of trades less than $10,000 2 + total number of trades during 75-minute period (TAQi
Positive
(High price -low price)+ low price during 75-rninute period (TAQ)
Positive
Standard deviation of price + mean price during 75-rninute period (TAQ)
Total trading volume in shares during 75-rninute period (TAQ)
Positive
?
Number of trades between $10,000 and $50,000 + total number of trades during 75-rninute
period (TAQ)
Percentage of large trades
LG TRADE
Number of trades greater than $50,000 + total number of trades during 75-rninute period (TAQ)
?
Because the decision to provide open or closed conference calls pertains to calls made primarily in 1999-2000, we use data from the most recent fiscal year
provided in the Compustat dataset (fiscal years ended June 1999 - May 2000) and from the calendar year 1999 for CRSP, Spectrum, and IBES. Size deciles for
adjusting LNOWN and LNEMP are based on total sales.
2
Trades sizes classified as small, medium, or large are based on the largest round-lot size less than or equal to the given dollar threshold, computed using the
price at the beginning of the trading period.
3
See Figure 1 for a timeline depiction of the 75-rninute period around the conference call. All data comes from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.

Variable
Percentage of small trades
Maximum price change
Coefficient of variation
Trading volume
Percentage of medium trades

Variable
Name
SMTRADE
HI LO
CVPRICE
TVOL
MDTRADE
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics on firm characteristics of conference call firms

Panel A: Open vs. closed conference call firms 1
Open Call Firms (n = 1,799)
Closed Call firms (n = 1,475)
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
NOWN 2
0.273
-1.967
-0. 275
-2.267**
PIH
0.359
0.335
0.421**
0.43 1**
4.017*
2.000**
NAL
3.594
1.000
MTURN
0.184
0. 113
0.123**
0.077**
VREV
1.973
0.329
1. 185**
0.237**
BP
0.474
0.311
0.597**
0.470**
0. 194
IRSQ
0.296
0. 209
0.291
INTAN
0.095
0.009
0.126**
0.035**
DHTECH
0.196
0.000
0.130**
0.000
-0. 126
-0.086
-0.25 1 *
NEMP
0.062
MV
4604.679
465. 191
4125.626
474.232
146. 166
82.000
181.355**
93.000**
TIME
** (*) Significantly different from mean or median of open call firms at the 0.01 (0.05) level

Panel B: Webcast vs. telephone-only open conference call firms 3
Webcast Firms (n =1,575)
Telephone-only firms (n = 224)
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
0.330
-1.960
-0. 126
-2.061
NOWN
PIH
0.352
0.318
0.404**
0.406**
NAL
3.572
1.000
3.750
1.000
0.150**
0.098*
MTURN
0. 188
0.115
VREV
2.031
0.340
1.560
0.285*
BP
0.468
0.305
0.515
0.3 48
IRSQ
0.286
0. 194
0.325*
0.263*
INTAN
0.094
0.008
0.103
0.021
0.121**
DHTECH
0.206
0.000
0.000
NEMP
0.400
-0. 120
0.219
-0. 166
MV
4919.515
473.285
2390.989*
352.218
79.000
175.821*
103.000**
TIME
141.949
** (*) Significantly different from mean or median ofwebcast firms at the 0.0 1 (0.05) level
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Table 3 (continued)
Descriptive statistics on firm characteristics of conference call firms

Panel C: Correlation matrix affirm characteristics 4
LNOWN PIH
NAL MTIJRN VREV
LNOWN
1.00
-0.06* -0. 07* -0.01
0.06*
-0.
07*
0.25*
-0.24*
-0.
28*
1.00
PIH
-0. 07* 0.24* 1.00
0.04* -0.11 *
NAL
MTURN -0. 02
-0.1 2* 0.12*
1.00
0.24*
VREV
0. 04* -0.37* -0. 16* 0.33*
1.00
BP
-0.08* 0.23* -0.05* -0.40* -0.20*
IRSQ
-0.02
0.15 * -0.0 1
-0. 12* -0.11 *
INTAN
-0. 11 * 0.11 * 0.11 * -0.10* -0.04*
-0.16* 0.02
0.27* 0.13*
DHTECH 0. 02
-0.01
0.06* 0.06* -0.05*
LNEMP -0.01
LMV
0.03
0.31 * 0.34* 0.16* -0.16*
LTIME
0. 13* 0.50* 0.10* -0.30* -0.43*
* Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level

BP
-0.08*
0. 18*
-0.06*
-0.28*
-0.12*
1.00
0.21*
0.14*
-0.29*
-0.04*
-0.37*
0.22*

1

IRSQ
-0.03
0 .10*
-0.02
-0 .10 *
-0.08*
0 .13*
1.00
-0.01
-0.48*
-0.09*
-0.11 *
0.19*

INTAN DHTECH LNEMP
-0.11 * 0.02
-0.02
0.04* -0.18*
-0.02
0 .05*
0. 06*
0.0 2
-0.06 * 0.23*
0. 04*
0.02
0.03
-0.0 1
-0.05*
0.10* -0.24*
-0.02
-0.36*
-0.08*
1.00
-0.0 1
0.16*
-0.05*
0. 08*
1.00
0 .19 * 0.0 8*
1.00
0 .00
0.0 8*
-0.02
0 .04* -0.20*
-0.08*

LMV LTIME
0.04* 0 .12*
0.28* 0.53*
0.35 * 0 .12 *
0.14* -0.34*
-0.07* -0.28*
-0.39* 0 .13*
-0. 14* 0.12*
-0.01
-0.04*
0.08* -0.20*
-0.06 *
0.00
1.00
0 .23*
0.21 * 1.00

Open conference calls are defined as calls that provide unlimited access to the call. These calls are listed on the
BestCalls.com database. Closed conference calls are defined as calls that provide restricted access to selected
parties only. These calls are listed on the First Call database and n ot on the BestCalls.com database.
2
See Table 2 for variable definitions.
3
Webcast calls are provided via the Internet and may also be simultaneously provided vi a telephone. Telephoneonly calls are only available by calling into either a toll-free or toll access number. All of these calls are open
conference calls.
4
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are above (below) the diagonal.
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Table 4
Analysis of the determinants of the choice to provide open conference calls
Prob (Open or Web) = F ( f3 0 + f3 1INOWN ; + f3 2 PIH ; + f3 3 NAL; + f3 4 MTURN ; + f3 5 VREV; + f3 6 BP;
+ f3 7 IRSQ, + f3 8 INTAN ; + f3 9 D HTECH , + f3 10 LNEMP, + f3 11 LMV; + f3 12 L TIME ; + £ ; )

Prob(Open) 1
Coefficient
Marginal 3
(p-value)
Impact
0 .306
(0.187)

Variable
INTERCEPr

LNOWN

+

Prob (Webcast) 2
Coefficient
Marginal
(p-value)
Impact
3.376
(0 .008)

0 .054
(0.036)

0 .03 1

0.1 19
(0 .2 19)

0.030

PIH

-1.150
(0.000)

-0.12 9

-1.5 60
(0 .0 11)

-0 .077

NAL

-0.05 1
(0.004)

-0 .064

-0.077
(0 .039)

-0.043

1.973
(0.000)

0 .067

0.242
(0 .645)

0.004

0 .05 1
(0.014)

0 .00 6

-0.0 62
(0 .354)

-0 .003

MTURN

+

VREV

BP

+

0 .009
(0.483)

0 .00 1

0 .1 19
(0 .185)

0 .008

IRSQ

+

0 .249
(0.066)

0 .020

-0.0 14
(0 .958)

-0 .000

INTAN

-0.92 1
(0.000)

-0 .036

-0.2 93
(0 .537)

-0.005

DHTECH

0 .283
(0.011)

0 .006

0.33 1
(0 .164)

0 .013

LNEMP

+

-0.037
(0.366)

-0 .009

0.170
(0 .593)

0 .019

LMV

?

0 .022
(0.335)

0 .014

0.176
(0 .000)

0.049

LTIME

?

-0.023
(0.613)

-0 .008

-0.196
(0 .035)

-0.032

x2-statistic
Pseudo -R 2

217 .27 1
(0.000)
0 .178

49.875
(0.000)
0 .052

1

This regression models the probability of providing an open conferen ce call instead of a closed call. Open call
fi rms provide unlimited access ( 1,799 firms), whereas closed call firms provide restricted access (1,475 firms).
2
This regression models the probability of providing an open call via a webcast instead of by telephone only .
Webcast firms provide access via the Internet (1,57 5 firms), where tel ephone-only firms provide access via a tollfree or toll access number only (224 firms).
3
The marginal impact represents the change in the probability of providing an open (or webcast) call given a change
in the independent variable across its interquartile range (i .e. from the 25th to the 75th percentile). For the indicator
variable DHTECH, the marginal impact is the difference in probability when the variable equals one versus when it
equals zero, evaluat ed. at the mean o f the other v ariabl es.
4

See Table 2 for variable definitions.
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics on the market effects of conference calls

Panel A : Comparison ofmeans and medians between open and closed conference calls
SMTRADE2

MDTRADE

LGTRADE

1

HI LO

CVPRC

LTVOL

N

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

1,463

0.663

0.667

0.250

0.252

0.086

0.093

0.043

0.027

0.011

0.008

13.354

13.344

Closed Calls 1,713

0.579

0.556

0.286

0.294

0.135

0.169

0.030

0.019

0.008

0.006

13.646

13.618

10.450

8.420

5.970

5.230

10.460

7.590

7.140

7.800

8.730

7.440

3.840

2.380

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.00 1

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.0171

Open Calls

test statistic3
p-value

Panel B: Comparison of means and medians between webcast and telephone-only conference calli
SMTRADE
N

MDTRADE

Mean

Median

1,302

0.666

0.667

0.249

0.250

161

0.643

0.637

0.258

test statistic3

1.190

2.250

p-value

0.234

013'5

Webcast Calls
Phone-only Calls

Mean

Median

LGTRADE
Mean

HI LO

CVPRC

LTVOL

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

0.085

0.091

0.043

0.027

0.011

0.008

13.352

13 .313

0.262

0.099

0. 113

0.042

0.025

0.01 1

0.007

13.372

13.780

0.590

0.760

1.340

2.680

0.210

1.010

0.120

2.080

0.110

1.430

0 ..'543

0 447

0.1 R1

0 oos

O.S07

0.3 12

0.919

003S

0.911

0 .1 .'53

1

Open conference calls are defined as calls that provide unlimited access to the call. Closed calls are defined as calls that provide restricted access.
See Table 2 for variable definitions.
3
The "test statistic" is at-statistic for the means and a z-statistic for the medians. We use the t-statistic for unequal variances if the folded F-test indicates it is
appropriate; otherwise we use the t-statistic for equal variances. All p-values are two -tailed.
4
Webcast conference calls are provided via the Internet and may also be simultaneously provided via telephone. Telephone-only calls are only available by
calling into either a toll-free or toll access number.
2
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Table 6
Changes analysis of the market effects of providing open conference calls
Panel A : Tests ofdifferences in means and medians between open and closed conference calls 1
ASMTRADE2

AMDTRADE

ALGTRADE

AHI LO

ACVPRC

ALTVOL

N

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

1,463

0.101

0.351

0.164

0.421

0.259

0.300

0.017

0.008

0.003

0.002

0.641

0.572

Closed Calls 1,713

0.014

0.286

0.158

0.448

0.221

0.357

0.011

0.005

0.002

0.001

0.655

0.622

test statistic3

2.590

2.670

0.180

0.680

1.210

1.200

3.460

4.450

3.090

3.670

0.280

0.750

p-value

0.010

0.008

0.861

0.499

0.223

0.231

0.001

0.001

0.003

0.001

0.779

0.455

Open Calls

Panel B: Tests of differences in means and medians between webcast and telephone-only conference calli
ASMTRADE
N

AMDTRADE

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

1,302

0.106

0.354

0.105

0.421

161

0.056

0.333

0.182

test statistic3

0.660

0.580

p-value

O.R16

o .'io'i

Webcast Calls
Phone-only Calls

ALGTRADE
Mean

AHI LO

ACVPRC

ALTVOL

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

0.248

0.250

0.017

0.008

0.003

0.002

0.628

0.593

0.438

0.341

0.500

0.018

0.009

0.004

0.002

0.754

0.832

0.230

0.260

1.520

1.600

0.370

0.093

0.100

1.240

1.120

1.600

OR29

0 79)

0.131

0 111

0.714

0.926

0.91.'i

0.214

0.24.'i

0. 111

1

Mean

Median

Open conference calls are defined as calls that provide unlimited access to the call. Closed calls are defined as calls that provide restricted access.
Except for ASMTRADE, AMDTRADE and ALGTRADE, these variables are the difference between the value of the variable in the conference call period (see
Table 2 for variable definitions) and the value of the variable in the control period one day earlier (see Figure 1 for a timeline). The ASMTRADE variable is
defined as the number of small trades in the call period minus the number of small trades in the control period, divided by the number of small trades in the call
f eriod. AMDTRADE and ALGTRADE are defined analogously.
The "test statistic" is at-statistic for the means and a z-statistic for the medians. We use the t-statistic for unequal variances if the folded F-test indicates it is
appropriate; otherwise we use the t-statistic for equal variances. All p -values are two -tailed.
4
Webcast conference calls are provided via the Internet and may also be simultaneously provided via telephone. Telephone-only calls are only available by
calling into either a toll-free or toll access number.
2
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T a ble 7
Maximu m like liho o d e s timatio n o f the m ar ket effe c ts o f p rov iding o p e n conferen ce c a lls 1

Panel A : Levels analysis
Variable 2
INTERCEPT

SMTRADE
1.1950
0.000

MDTRADE
-0.041 4
(0.010)

LGTRADE
-0.17 11
0.000

HI LO
0.0583
0.000

CVPRC
0.0122
0 .000

LTVOL
8.13 17
0.000

OCALL

0.0209
(0.010)

-0.0040
(0.503)

-0.0145
(0.004)

0.0053
(0.002)

0.0006
(0.002)

0.0867
(0.122)

LNOWN

0.011 1
(0.000)

-0.0091
0.000

-0.0002
(0.924)

0.0012
(0.019)

0.0000
(0.658)

0.0133
(0.497)

MTURN

0.0431
(0.268)

0.0359
(0. 165)

-0.0542
(0.015)

0.0792
0.000

0.0086
0 .000

3.6880
0.000

PIH

-0.3103
0.000

0. 1712
0.000

0.1329
0.000

-0.0307
0.000

-0.0048
0 .000

1.4055
0.000

BP

0.005 1
(0.011)

-0.0029
(0.032)

-0.0018
(0.574)

-0.0001
(0.626)

0 .0000
(0.296)

-0.0427
(0.001)

LMV

-0.0736
0.000

0.0350
0.000

0.0396
0.000

-0.0029
0.000

-0.0006
0 .000

0.6633
0.000

.1.MDTRADE
1.4640
0.000

.1.LGTRADE
0.2787
0.000

.1.HI LO
0.0173
0.000

.1.CVPRC
0.0026
0 .000

.1.LTVOL
1.4364
0.000

Panel B: Changes Analysis
Variable
INTERCEPT

.1.SMTRADE
-0.0404
(0.636)

3

OCALL

0.0775
(0.012)

0.0477
(0. 325)

-0.0056
(0.803)

0.0021
(0.073)

0.0003
(0.125)

0.0596
(0.329)

LNOWN

-0.0123
(0.249)

-0.0130
(0.026)

-0.0062
(0.429)

0.0002
(0.5 19)

0.0000
(0.679)

-0.0169
(0.260)

MTURN

0.3732
(0.001)

-0.2010
(0.000)

0.2833
(0.000)

0.0269
0.000

0.0032
0 .000

0.3788
(0.037)

PIH

-0. 1908
(0. 135)

-0.0418
(0.533)

0.1 871
(0.036)

-0.0 114
(0.006)

-0.00 10
(0.217)

0.4 116
(0.015)

BP

-0.0013
(0.951)

-0.0001
(0. 994)

-0.0046
(0.511)

-0.0001
(0.898)

0 .0000
(0.911)

-0.0149
(0.375)

LMV

0.0219
-0.0735
-0.0134
-0.0007
-0.0001
-0.0484
(0.052)
0.000
(0.086)
(0.056)
(0.258)
(0.001)
1
Results reported are from a maximum likelihood estimation of the effects of open conference calls (and control
variables) on the market effects variable shown at the top of each column. The model was estimated jointly with a
model of the determinants of open conference calls identical to the model in Table 4 (results not reported).
Coefficients and two-sided p-values (in parentheses) from each model are reported in the columns below.
2
OCALL is an indicator variable equal to one i f the firm hosts an open conference call and zero otherwise. In both
sets of analyses, the coefficient on OCALL is predicted to be positive in the SMTRADE, HI_LO, CVPRC, and
LTVOL model. We make no predictions for OCALL in the MDTRADE and LG TRADE models or for any of the
control variables. Table 2 provides definitions of the remaining variables.
3
Except for .1.SMTRADE, .1.MDTRADE and &GTRADE, these variables are the difference between the value of
the variable in the conference call period (see Table 2 for variable definitions) and the value of the variable in the
control period one day earlier (see Figure 1 for a timeline). The .1.SMTRADE variable is defined as the number of
small trades in the call period minus the number of small trades in the control period, divided by the number of
small trades in the call period. .1.MDTRADE and .1.LGTRADE are defined analogously.
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